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Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper provides evidence on the impact of regulatory environment on financial 
reporting quality of transitional economies.  This study compares the financial reporting 
quality of Hong Kong firms which are cross-listed in mainland China with those of Hong 
Kong firms cross-listed in China using specific earnings management metrics (earnings 
smoothing, timely loss recognition, value relevance and managing towards earnings targets) 
under pre and post IFRS regimes.  
Design/Methodology: The financial reporting quality of Chinese A-share companies and 
Hong Kong listed companies are examined using earnings management measures. Using 
2007 as base year, the study used a cumulative of -5 and +5 years of convergence experience 
which provide a total of 3,000 firm year observations. In addition to regression analyses, we 
used the difference-in-difference analysis to check for the impact of regulatory environments 
on earnings management.    
Findings:  Through the lens of contingency theory, our results indicate that the adoption of 
the new substantially IFRS-convergent accounting standards in China results in better 
financial reporting quality evidenced by less earning management.  The empirical results 
further shows that accounting data are more value relevant for Hong Kong listed firms, and 
that firms listed in China are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management 
than in real earnings management activities. We established that different earnings 
management practices that are seemingly tolerable in one country may not be tolerable in 
another due to level of differences in the regulatory environments. 
Research Implications: The findings show that Hong Kong listed companies’ exhibit higher 
level of financial reporting quality than Chinese listed companies, which implies that the 
financial reporting quality under IFRS can be significantly different in regions with different 
institutional, economic and regulatory environments. The results implies that contingent 
factors such as a country’s institutional structures, its extent of regulation and the strength of 
its investor protection environments impact on financial reporting quality particularly in 
transitional and emerging economies. As such, these factors need be given appropriate 
considerations by financial reporting regulators and policy makers interested in controlling 
earnings management practices among their corporations.  
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Originality/Value: This study is a high impact study considering that China plays a 
significant role in today’s globalized economy. This study is unique as it the first, that we are 
aware of, to compare real earnings activities against accrual-based earnings management in 
pre and post IFRS adoption periods within the Chinese and Hong Kong financial reporting 
environments, distinguishing between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. 
Key words:  Financial, earning, quality, cash flow, emerging markets 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The effect of regulatory environment and the adoption of IFRS on financial reporting quality 
could vary across different countries. The mixed findings documented by prior studies can be 
explained by countries’ institutional structures. Many studies argue that developing and 
transitional economies still have ineffective regulatory institutions despite any fast growth in 
their capital market. China is the largest developing country in the world, yet characterised 
with concentrated ownership structures, weak legal systems and highly politicised 
institutional arrangements (Piotroski and Wong, 2011). As a result, prior studies attribute low 
financial reporting quality to ineffective regulation and infrastructure (Eccher and Healy 
2003, Ball et al. 2000).  
 
Whilst both countries share common cultural backgrounds, there is a significant difference in 
their interpretation of financial results and reporting. While Hong Kong analysts rely more on 
fundamental and technical analyses in their financial reporting (Wong and Cheung, 1999), the 
Chinese lean towards portfolio analysis.  As a result of significant differences (in terms of the 
economy, regulatory and legal systems) between mainland China and Hong Kong, this study 
compares the financial reporting quality of Hong Kong firms which are cross-listed in 
mainland China with those of Hong Kong firms cross-listed in China using earnings 
management metrics under IFRS regime. Hong Kong has converged with IFRS since January 
1, 2005. To match the post-convergence period with China, the accounting quality is 
compared for these two key emerging economies in the period from 2007 to 2011. 
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With the achievements of China’s economic reform, their accounting system also has 
experienced tremendous changes. The earliest effort of converging Chinese domestic 
accounting system with international practices began in 1979, in which all joint ventures with 
foreign investments were required to be regulated under a set of accounting regulations. 
Subsequently, a set of accounting standards based on International Accounting Standards 
(IAS), known as Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE), was released in 
1992. This was a historic progress in the transitional reform of China’s dogmatic accounting 
system. Between 1997 and 2001, China attempted to issue a series of new accounting 
standards to move toward International Accounting Standards (Chen and Peng, 2007). 
As the Chinese come under increasing scrutiny by the international investment community, 
as well as their domestic capital markets, identifying acceptable financial measures of 
performance could guide benchmarking activities and regulatory monitoring (Avkiran, 2011). 
Our study provides evidence that substantial convergence of IFRS can improve financial 
reporting quality in a transitional and emerging economy such as China.  
According to prior studies (Lang et al, 2006; Peng, 2005 and Leuz et al, 2003), accounting quality is 
higher in countries with a common law origin and high shareholder protection. However, in recent 
years, the Chinese government as well as Chinese listed firms have more incentives and 
pressures to enhance their financial reporting quality due to the rapid development of their 
equity markets and their desire to attract capital worldwide (Peng, 2005). By enhancing the 
efficiency of capital market infrastructure, China has made great efforts towards changing its 
accounting regulations (Chen, Wang and Zhao, 2009). With the ongoing liberalisation of the 
Chinese economy and the increasingly competitive business environment, the need for 
Chinese firms to ensure greater efficiency and improve the quality of their  financial reporting  
have become understandably very high (Laurenceson and Qin, 2008). 
Specifically, government regulatory authorities have strengthened the regulation of 
information disclosure policies of listed companies. Chen and Peng (2007) find that such 
policy has helped in curbing earnings management opportunism in the application of Chinese 
accounting standards. This also indicates that effective regulatory enforcement is significant 
in the harmonisation of China’s accounting practices with IFRS. Furthermore, Street and 
Gray (2002) provide the evidence that there is high compliance with accounting rules due to 
improved audit regulation and monitoring systems in China.  
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It is worth mentioning that the new Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) are not complete 
translations of IFRS as there are a few differences which represent China’s unique 
environment  and business practice.   For example, in the new CAS, the reversal of asset 
impairment charges is prohibited, related party disclosure requirement is revised to reflect the 
context of state-ownership and the application of fair value is also tailor-made to reflect the 
need of the Chinese economy (Peng and Smith, 2010). Though there are scepticisms as to 
whether the Chinese authorities can effectively regulate some aspects of the IFRS (for 
example, the fair value accounting – FVA), the convergence was regarded by both the 
Chinese government and the IASB as a significant move towards the development of the 
Chinese economy and its place in the world’s global economy (Zhang et al, 2012). 
 
Under the policy of one country-two systems, Hong Kong can be considered as a separate 
market from China. Prior to its IFRS adoption in 2005, Hong Kong applied its own 
accounting standards, which were independent of mainland China. The aim of the current 
study is to analyse, through the frame of contingency theory, the effect of the regulatory 
environments on earnings management and financial reporting quality of firms in the pre and 
post IFRS adoption periods in both countries. The remainder of this paper is organised as 
follows: section 2 discusses the study’s theoretical framework, contingency theory; section 3 
provides a concise review of literature on earnings management within the context of 
financial reporting while section 4 contains the research methods comprising details of 
sample selection used in the study, earnings metrics as used in the empirical work and how 
the study’s hypotheses were developed. Section 5 discusses the study’s results including 
those of the sensitivity analyses and further tests conducted while the final section draws the 
conclusion, summarises the major findings and their implications, identifies the study’s 
limitations and makes suggestions for future research in the subject area. 
 
2. Theoretical framework: The Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory was first popularised as a tool to explain organisational differentiation 
and integration through environmental factors (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). It is premised 
on a heuristic concept that oppose managers’ tendency to adopt universalistic solutions and 
peddling panaceas (Wood, 1979). Contingency theory attempts to explain structural and 
process differences among organisations with respect to their operating environment, 
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technology, size, strategy and culture among others (Scott, 1987). Therefore, within an 
organisational context, the following are the three basic principles of the contingency theory: 
a) there is no one best way to organise; b) different ways to organise are not equally effective; 
c) the best way to organise depends on the nature of the environment to which the 
organisation relates (Scott, 1987; Bartol and Martin, 1994).  
The intricacies of adopting, adapting and operating IFRS by different countries make 
contingency theory a potent framework to diagnose, understand and manage IFRS adoption. 
As this current study seeks to examine the effects of regulatory environments on earnings 
management within the context of two related but different countries (China and Hong 
Kong), the contingency theory is considered the most appropriate framework through which 
to gain an understanding of different contingent factors that could affect financial reporting 
quality under an IFRS regime.   
 
The use of the theory is not strange in accounting research as it has been adopted in different 
areas of the subject because of its versatility. These areas include management accounting 
(Hayes, 1977; Otley, 1980; Hopwood, 1983; Gul and Chia, 1994); governmental accounting 
(Luder, 1992; Gupta and Dirsmith, 1994); accounting information systems (Gordon and 
Miller, 1976; Rayburn and Rayburn, 1991; Nicolaou, 2000); accounting education (Lopez 
Gavira and Omoteso, 2013) accounting ethics (Schweikart, 1992); auditing (Omoteso, 2013); 
and financial reporting (Thomas, 1986; Thomas, 1991; Xiao et al., 1996).  
 
 
3. Earnings Management and Financial Reporting 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) defined earnings management as the alteration of a firm’s 
financial reports by insiders in order to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence 
contractual outcomes that are dependent on numbers in the financial reports. This can be in 
the form of a deliberate attempt to distort financial data which may not be very apparent to 
investors. Earnings management is generally understood to mean attempts by company 
insiders to protect their positions and benefits by manipulating the financial information 
provided to outsiders. This often takes the form of income smoothing or income 
manipulation. 
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However, measuring the degree of earnings management has presented challenges (Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000), as it is 
difficult to establish such manipulation.  In practice, insiders can “smooth,” i.e., reduce the 
variability of reported earnings, by altering the accruals of revenues and expenses. Thus any    
indication of a reduction in the variability of earnings, (often called earning smoothing) 
would suggest that the firm is involved in earnings management. Conversely, a higher 
earnings smoothing implies that a firm is less likely to manage its earnings effectively.  
As Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) indicate, if the fluctuation of operating earnings is small in 
comparison to the fluctuation of cash flow from operations, it is likely that management has 
used discretionary accruals to smooth reported operating earnings.  This measure is based on 
the idea that insiders may attempt to hide reductions in cash flow by manipulating the 
accruals.  The indication is that accruals for firms that wish to manipulate their reported 
earnings will be large compared to the cash flow from operations (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000). As Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) argue, firms operating in regulatory 
environments can retain their ability to consume private benefits by keeping firm disclosures 
obscure. This allows them to not only extract benefits when the firm performs well but also to 
keep a poorly performing firm active (Wang and Campbell, 2012; Fang and  Zhou, 2012).  
The above earnings management practice is usually accrual-based which are otherwise 
discretionary accruals. In other words, management use their discretion to manipulate the 
earning in order to avoid reporting huge losses. In practice though, management also engage 
in real earnings manipulations such as acceleration of the timing of sales through price 
discounts, reporting of lower cost of costs sold through increased production, and decrease in 
discretionary expenses such as advertising cost and research and development (Cohen et al, 
2008; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Interestingly, Roychowdhury (2006) adds that some of 
the real earnings management activities are departures from normal operations activities 
which do not necessarily contribute to the firm value but may help managers meet up with 
their reporting goals. Our study makes a significant contribution by examining both earning 
management practices among Chinese and Hong Kong cross-listed firm. To the best of our 
knowledge, none of the existing studies on earnings management among Chinese and Hong 
Kong financial reporting systems has covered both practices. 
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4. Research Questions 
Although several studies have been conducted on the impact of adoption of IFRS on financial 
reporting quality and earnings management in China, our current study differs substantially in 
approach and scope in several ways. First, our study examines the effect of regulatory 
environment on earnings management by comparing firms in one country
2
, but under two 
regulatory environments. This is important because firms operating in China are highly 
regulated by the state whilst Hong Kong is seen as market oriented with strong equity and 
transparent reporting environment (Wong and Cheung, 1999; Loh, 2006). Prior studies have 
established that benefits from mandatory adoption of IFRS are found in countries and regions 
with certain characteristics such as legal enforcement and transparent reporting environment, 
none of such studies (Barth et al, 2008; Gordon et al, 2012; Peng and Bewley, 2010) have 
tested such hypotheses on regions with dual regulatory environments e.g. China and Hong 
Kong.  
Second, our study compares real earnings activities against accrual based earnings 
management in the pre and post IFRS adoption periods in both regulatory environments. This 
helps to examine whether firms in the regions are more likely to engage in real or 
discretionary accruals earnings manipulations in any or both countries, and the impact of 
IFRS adoption in regulating such practices. Most studies on accounting quality and earnings 
management among Chinese firms apply the commonly used metrics such as earning 
smoothing, timely loss recognition and value relevance. In addition to these commonly used 
measures, our study further adds real earnings management activities metrics such as 
manipulations in the revenue or sales, production costs and discretionary expenses
3
. We use 
the abnormal cash flows, abnormal production cost and discretionary expenses by firms in 
both regions to compare with the accrual-based earnings managements using discretionary 
accrual metric. This approach allows us to control for any industry-wide changes in economic 
conditions across the regions. Prior studies on China such as Liu et al (2011), Lin and Chen 
(2005); Li (2010) did not consider discretionary accruals and real earnings activities of firms 
in their studies but used the commonly accrual-based measures only. Although these studies 
focused on Chinese firms, none compared the earnings management activities with Hong 
Kong firms. Our study therefore fills the gap. 
                                                          
2
  Hong Kong and China operate a ‘one country, two systems’ governance model. Although Hong Kong is 
considered relatively dependent of China, they both have different and independent regulatory, political and 
institutional frameworks (Loh, 2006). 
3
 For details on real and accrual-based earnings management activities metrics by firms, see Cohen et al (2008). 
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Third, in contrast to previous studies, we distinguish between cross-listed firms and non-cross 
listed firms. This is important because state controlled firms in China which are not cross- 
listed are often subjected to government control. Lee (2001) finds that firms receiving more 
government financial support will have a lower incentive to improve financial reporting even 
after IFRS adoption. In such cases, government directives are often of more importance than 
the interest of investors (Kim, 2012). 
 Such political influence have been found to have far reaching effect on Hong Kong firms 
that are cross listed in China (Piotroski et al, 2011). Finally, we apply difference-in-difference 
analysis to compare the impact of differences in regulatory environments on earnings 
management   between China and Hong Kong firms before and after IFRS adoption. These 
distinctions in our approach and techniques differentiate our paper from previous studies and 
thus make significant contributions to the earnings management literature. 
We formulate three research questions; the first question helps to establish and identify the 
level of earnings management practices in both countries; and to consider the influence of 
IFRS adoption in reducing such practices.  The research questions are formulated thus:   
RQ1: To what extent are the management of earnings by cross listed firms affected by the 
adoption of IFRS in the two countries? 
 
Some empirical studies suggest that firms are less likely to manage reported earnings toward 
a positive target after converging with IFRS ( Liu et al, 2011; Leuz et al, 2003; Lang et al, 
2006). If this argument is correct, it is imperative to distinguish between real and accrual-
based earnings management by firms. The distinction between both forms of earnings 
management is important as this may be influenced by the regulatory environment of both 
countries. We argue that firms from stronger regulatory environments may curb accrual-
based earnings management but may or may not allow real earnings management. Previous 
studies on China IFRS adoption (Liu et al, 2011; Chin et al, 2009; Liou and Yang, 2008) have 
not considered such comparisons in earnings management in their sampled firms. Thus, our 
second research question addressed the following question: 
RQ2: To what extent do the regulatory environments affect both real earnings and 
discretional accruals management by firms in China and Hong Kong? 
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The study takes into consideration the uniqueness of Chinese adoption of IFRS and compares 
the effect of IFRS adoption in both environments.  Unlike China, Hong Kong is a market-
oriented economy, with strong equity market and transparent reporting environment. 
According to prior studies, benefits from mandatory adoption of IFRS are found only in 
countries and regions with strong legal enforcement and transparent reporting environment 
characteristics.  For example, Bailey, Harte and Sugden (2000) argue that for financial 
reporting to be more credible, it should contain complete picture of corporate activity such as 
the management of earnings, role of accounting information and regulation. This is correct to 
the extent that accounting reports play important roles in shaping investors views and 
ideology. Therefore, to investigate the influence of such institutional factors on financial 
reporting quality, this study also examines the third research question: 
RQ3: To what extent does the Chinese financial reporting quality differ from the Hong 
Kong listed firms under IFRS? 
 
5.  Methodology 
 
5.1 Sample selection 
To compare the financial reporting quality for Chinese A-share firms and Hong Kong firms 
under IFRS regime, we first obtained a sample of all Hong Kong cross-listed firms in China 
and also Chinese A-share firms that are cross-listed in Hong Kong markets. Although, Hong 
Kong commenced full convergence with IFRS in 2005, we used 2007 as the base year to 
allow a matched sample for Chinese A-share firms with same mandatory convergence period.  
We chose cross-listed firms to enable us check for the impact of regulatory environments on 
the behaviour of the firms in the management of earnings. We also tested our results on a set 
of non-cross-listed firms of both nations. Further, we selected a matched sample of firms 
based on key characteristics such as total assets, market capitalisation, sales growth and 
return on assets.  Our final sample consists of 250 Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong market 
and 100 Hong Kong firms listed in China A-share market. 
The empirical analysis straddles two separate periods, one is defined as the post-convergence 
period from 2007 to 2011 and the other is defined as pre-convergence period from 2002 to 
2006, which provides a cumulative of -5 and +5 years of convergence experience 3000 firm-
year observations for the study. All financial and accounting data are collected from 
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Thomson One databases. The sample firms are from a wide range of industries, with most in 
consumer discretionary, financials, industrials, IT and energy among others. 
 
5.2 Research design 
Our design comprises of both accrual-based earnings measures and real earnings activities 
between the two countries and across the IFRS adoption periods. We differentiate between 
discretionary accruals and real earnings as these activities may be affected by the regulatory 
environments existing in both countries. We further applied the difference-in-difference 
analysis to check the impact of the regulatory environments on earnings management 
between the two countries. We also mitigated for the impact of cross-listing activities on our 
result by composing a control group of firms that are indigenous to both China and Hong 
Kong which are not cross-listed in both countries. This enables us to check for any other 
factors that might be correlated with cross-listing decision which might affect accounting data 
(Lang et al, 2006).  
 
5.2.1 Earnings management metrics 
We apply earnings smoothing, timely loss recognition, value relevance as well as managing 
toward earnings targets as measures of earnings management (Lang et al, 2006; Barth et al, 
2008; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).   
According to prior research, higher earnings quality is an indication of less earning 
management or less earnings smoothing. Earnings management can be evaluated from two 
perspectives: earnings smoothing and managing reported earnings toward a positive 
objective. Based on Barth et al (2008), we chose control variables that are associated with 
China convergence with IFRS and that might affect financial reporting. These include firms’ 
size, growth, capital structure, debt and equity issuing and auditors.   
 
Earnings Smoothing 
The first earnings smoothing approach is to measure the volatility of earnings. If firms 
maximise their earnings opportunities, their earning variability should be lower than firms 
with less earning management. Therefore, following prior studies, the fluctuation in reported 
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earnings are measured by the change in annual net income (scaled by annual total assets). The 
reported earnings can be sensitive to a series of other factors that are non-attributable to 
mandatory introduction of IFRS. Although in this study, a number of control variables and 
industry fixed effects identified in previous studies (Lang et al. 2006; Barth et al. 2008; 
Christensen et al. 2008) can mitigate these confounding factors to some extent. However, the 
effect of those factors may still remain. Therefore, the analysis is mainly focused on the 
residuals generated from the relevant regression rather than on the reported earnings 
themselves. This approach further differentiates our study from previous research in earnings 
management. 
Industry fixed-effect regression is conducted in the estimation (equations (1) to (6). The firm-
year observations are first pooled for the periods between 2002 and 2006 (pre-convergence) 
and the period between 2007 and 2011 (post-convergence). Then, the regression (Equation 1) 
is run separately for the firms in both time periods to obtain a set of residuals. Finally, the 
variance of the residuals (ΔNI*) are computed for the firms in the two periods and the 
difference compared with the variance ratio F-Test (Lang et al. 2006). 
Regression of ΔNI on the control variables is stated as: 
ΔNIit=α0 + α1SIZEit + α2GROWTHit + α3EISSUEit + α4DISSUEit + α5TURNit + α6LEVit + 
α7CFOit  + α8AUDit + εit     ..........................................................................................(1)                          
Where for firm i in year t: 
ΔNI= change in annual net income scaled by total assets;  SIZE = natural logarithm of total 
assets; GROWTH =percentage change in revenues; EISSUE = percentage change in common 
shareholders’ equity; DISSUE = percentage change in total liabilities; TURN = revenues 
divided by total assets; LEV = total liabilities divided by book value of equity; CFO = annual 
net cash flow from operating activities divided by total assets; AUD = dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 when the firm’s auditor is one of the Big Four accounting firms, that is, PwC, 
KPMG, E&Y, or D&T, and 0 otherwise.  
 Despite a wide range of control variables included in Equation 1, the variability of earnings 
may not be captured by those variables. As suggested by Lang et al. (2006), firm-specific 
factors connected with the underlying volatility of cash flow may still impact on the variance 
of earnings. Typically, when there are more fluctuated cash flows, firms should expect a 
more volatile net income. Therefore, the second earnings smoothing measure extends the 
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analysis of the first measure by benchmarking it against the volatility of cash flows. This 
involves calculating the ratio of the variability of the change in net income to the variability 
of cash flow. 
Similar to the first measure, the regression of the change in net income scaled by total assets 
(ΔNI) and the regression of change in operating cash flow scaled by total assets (ΔCF) is run 
on the same set of control variables identified in the first metric separately. Then, residuals 
from these two regressions are obtained accordingly. The ratio is based on the variance of 
those residuals. ΔNI* is residuals from the regression of ΔNI on the control variables 
(Equation 1) and ΔCF* is residuals from the regression of ΔCF on the control variables 
(Equation 2).  The regression of ΔCF on the control variables is represented as: 
ΔCFit=α0+α1SIZEit +α2GROWTHit+α3EISSUEit+α4DISSUEit 
+α5TURNit+α6LEVit+α7CFOit+α8AUDit+εit................................................... (2) 
As proposed by Leuz et al. (2003), firms are expected to manipulate reported earnings by 
utilising accruals and smooth fluctuations of cash flow streams. A negative relationship 
between accruals and cash flows should exist due to this effect on accounting accruals. Thus, 
the third earning smoothing metric is the Spearman correlation between accruals and cash 
flows. Correlations between cash flow residuals (CF∗) and accruals residuals (ACC*), rather 
than correlations between cash flow and accruals, are used in this study. Consistent with the 
previous two measures, the residuals are regressed from equation (3) and equation (4) on the 
similar control variables. Ceteris paribus, a larger magnitude of negative correlation between 
accruals and cash flows means earnings smoothing and poor earnings quality. 
Equation (3); Regression of CFO on the control variables is represented as:  
CFOit=α0+α1SIZEit +α2GROWTHit+α3EISSUEit+α4DISSUEit 
+α5TURNit+α6LEVit+α7CFOit+α8AUDit+εit  ...................................... (3) 
Equation (4): Regression of ACC on the control variables is represented as: 
ACC it=α0+α1SIZEit +α2GROWTHit+α3EISSUEit+α4DISSUEit 
+α5TURNit+α6LEVit+α7CFOit+α8AUDit+εit.................................................. (4) 
Where ACCit=NIit-CFit 
14 
 
After generating the residuals of CFO and ACC from above regressions, Spearman 
correlation rho can be computed for the firms in the two periods. Then, the study compares 
the correlations to evaluate a change in the earnings smoothing behaviour after IFRS 
convergence and further assesses the level of earnings smoothing in the different economies. 
 
Managing earnings toward a positive target 
The last earnings management metric is to test managing toward small positive earnings 
(SPOS). It is argued that managers have incentive to report small positive earnings instead of 
negative earnings. Moreover, the frequency of reporting small positive net income is higher 
for firms operating in poor investor protection environment (Leuz et al. 2003). Following 
prior studies (Lang et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006; Barth et al. 2008), we examine the 
frequency of small positive earnings. Dummy variable for SPOS is set to one if annual net 
income (scaled by total assets) is between 0 and 0.01, and equal to zero otherwise. We 
examine the probability of firms reporting small positive earnings change after transiting to 
IFRS, by interpreting the SPOS coefficient from the following regressions: 
Period (0,1) it = α0 + α1SIZEit + α2GROWTHit + α3EISSUEit + α4DISSUEit  
+ α5TURNit + α6LEVit + α7CFOit + α8AUDit + α9SPOSit + εit ................ (5) 
  
IFRS (0,1) it= α0 + α1SIZEit + α2GROWTHit + α3EISSUEit + α4DISSUEit 
+ α5TURNit + α6LEVit + α7CFOit + α8AUDit + α9SPOSit + εit .................(6) 
 
When comparing pre-convergence and post-convergence period, we analyse the regression of 
an indicator variables Period and IFRS (0, 1) equals one for the pre convergence period   and 
zero for post convergence period (Equations 5 and 6). A negative coefficient on SPOS would 
indicate the level at which firms report small positive earnings. When comparing for A-share 
firms and Hong Kong listed firm in the post-convergence period, IFRS (0, 1) is set to one for 
Hong Kong listed firms and zero for A-share firms.  
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Timely Loss Recognition 
Timeliness implies that once the managers notice economic losses, they should report the 
losses as soon as possible rather than wait passively and allowing the effect to spread over 
time. This is an important measurement for accounting quality. Based on Basu (1997) and 
Lang et al. (2006), our study focus on investigating the relationship between timeliness of 
accounting income and stock return to determine the timely loss recognition. The underlying 
concern is to measure whether accounting income can capture the market information in a 
timely fashion.  
Thus, we examine the reverse regressions of reported earnings on a series of independent 
variables, which include stock return, an indicator variable for negative return and the 
interaction of return with the indicator variable (Equation 7). The magnitude of the 
coefficient on the interaction of stock return with indicator variable can be explained as 
measurement for timeliness of loss recognition (Lang et al., 2006). Comparing pre and post 
periods, a larger coefficient of the firms will indicate that such firms recognize losses more 
timely.  The regression of earnings on returns is expressed as: 
NIPSit = α0 + α1RETURNit + α2BADit + α3RETURNit*BADit + εit  ............ (7) 
Where: NIPS = net income per share deflated by the price at the beginning of the period;  
BAD (0, 1) =dummy variable taking on 1 for firm i with negative returns in year t and 0 
otherwise; 
RETURN = the natural logarithm of the ratio of the stock price 6 months after fiscal year-end 
to the stock price 6 months before fiscal year-end, adjusted for dividends and stock splits. 
 
 Value Relevance 
High value relevance should be reflected as higher association between accounting numbers 
such as net income, equity book value and market-based information such as share prices, 
which suggests that accounting data is informative. Following Barth et al. (2001), value 
relevance is constructed in two metrics; price model and return model. 
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The first value relevance metric is based upon the explanatory power of the regression of 
share price on net income and equity book value. This is measured by R
2
 value of the price 
regression (Equation 8). In order to provide sufficient time for accounting and financial 
information absorbed by market, six months share price after the fiscal year-end is used 
following prior studies (Barth et al. 2001, Lang et al, 2003). Furthermore, to control the effect 
of differences across industries which may influence the explanatory power, share price is 
first regressed on industry fixed effects (SIC codes) to derive the price residuals. Then the 
regression of price residuals P∗ is run on equity book value per share (BVEPS) and net 
income per share (NIPS) separately in the pre and post IFRS convergence periods. Ceteris 
paribus, a higher R
2
 value would suggest that firms are expected to have a higher association 
between share price and accounting data. The regression of price residuals P* on BVEPS and 
NIPS is: 
P∗it = β0 + β1BVEPSit + β2NIPSit + εit   ......................................... (8） 
Where: 
P = share price six months after the fiscal year-end date; 
P* = residuals from a regression of P on industry fixed effects 
BVEPS = book value of equity per share; 
NIPS = annual net income per share. 
 
The second value relevance metric, the return model, is based on the approach of timely loss 
recognition to test the association between earnings and returns. In Equation 9, accounting 
earnings are defined as dependent variable and returns are defined as independent variable. 
The relationship between these two variables may be strong if firms report losses in timely 
manner, indicating that more earning information reflects in the market when the losses 
occur. As suggested by prior studies (Basu 1997; Ball et al. 2000; Barth et al. 2008), the 
analysis is not limited to the case of losses (negative return). Stock returns are separated into 
two cases: negative return and non-negative return. Thus, value relevance is examined by 
comparing explanatory power (R
2
 value) from regressions of net income per share on annual 
stock return for both cases. 
Similar to the price model, net income per share divided by beginning of year price (NI/P) is 
first regressed on industry fixed effects to obtain the residuals of NI/ P ([NI /P]∗). Then, 
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regressions are run separately for companies with ‘‘good news’’ (non-negative annual share 
returns) and companies with ‘‘bad news’’ (negative annual share returns) (Basu 1997; Ball et 
al. 2000; Barth et al. 2008). Good news observations represent those for which RETURN is 
non-negative while bad news observations represent those for which RETURN is negative. 
After pooling all observations in relevant groups, regressions are run separately for A-share 
companies and Hong Kong listed companies for both “good news” and “bad news” in the two 
respective periods. Higher R
2
 values for both cases imply higher level of value relevance. 
Where the regression of [NI/P]* on RETURN: 
[NI /P]∗it = β0 + β1RETURNit + εit             .....................................9 
Where: 
NI/P = annual net income per share scaled by share price at the beginning of fiscal year; 
[NI /P]∗ = residuals from a regression of NI/P on industry fixed effects; 
RETURN = the natural logarithm of the ratio of the stock price six months after fiscal year-
end to the stock price six months before fiscal year-end, adjusted for dividends and stock 
splits. 
 
5.2.2 Real earnings management and discretionary accrual management 
We further examined whether regulatory environment has an impact on real and accrual-
based earnings management of firms in China and Hong Kong by comparing the financial 
results in pre and post adoption periods. We argue that firms from stronger regulatory 
environments may curb accrual-based earnings management but may or may not allow real 
earnings management. Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms engage in real earnings 
management to avoid reporting losses. Using similar variables in Roychowdhury (2006) and 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we estimate real earning manipulations using abnormal cash 
flows from operation, production cost, and discretionary expenses. The cash flow from 
operation include the annual revenue, the production costs is the sum of goods sold while the 
discretional expenses comprise advertising expenses, research and development, selling, 
general and administrative expenses. The abnormality is measured by the deviations in the 
predicted values of the industry.  
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We measured discretionary accrual as the difference between total accruals (earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations
4
) less normal accruals, defined as 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
)−    NAit   .................................................10 
 Where TAit = is the total accruals which is defined as the EBXIit – CFOit of firm i and time t 
DAit = discretionary accrual of firm i and time t. EBXI is the earnings before extraordinary 
items and continued operations, CFO is the operating cash flows from continuing operations 
and  Assetsi,t-1 represents total assets. 
NAit = normal accruals is measured as   
K1  
1
Assetsi,t−1
+  𝐾2
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝐾3  
PPEit
Assetsi,t−1
  
 
Thus, our combined discretionary accrual model is: 
 
DAit =  (
EBXIit − CFOit  
Assetsi,t−1
) −  (K1
1
Assetsi,t−1
+  𝐾2
∇Salesit
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐾3
PPEit
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
) + 𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 .................11 
 
Using discretionary accruals allows us to control for industry wide changes in economic 
conditions that affect total accruals.  Prior studies on earnings management (Dechow et al, 
1998; Dicher and Skinner, 2002; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) have shown that these areas are 
susceptible to manipulation by firms. For example, Roychowdhury (2006) finds that 
unusually low cash flow and discretionary expenses (which includes advertising cost) and 
unusually high production costs exhibited by firms are likely signals of earnings 
manipulations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The discretionary accrual approach applied in our study is consistent with Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), we have presented the abridged cross-sectional model (see also Jones, 1991). 
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5.3 Hypotheses development 
Given the rapid development of Chinese economy and capital market, IFRS can be expected 
to be relevant to China. Regulators expect that IFRS adoption can contribute to great 
advantages, one of which is improved financial reporting quality
5
.  
As there are significant differences in terms of economy, regulatory and legal systems 
between mainland China and Hong Kong, we compare the financial reporting quality of 
Hong Kong firms listed in mainland China with Chinese listed firms in Hong Kong examine 
whether there are significant differences in financial reporting quality under IFRS regime 
operating in different regulatory environments.  
According to prior studies, accounting quality is higher in countries with a common law 
origin and high protection of shareholder. In sum, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the 
financial reporting quality in terms of earning management, timely loss recognition and value 
relevance will improve after substantially converging with IFRS. Therefore, the hypotheses 
are formulated as follow: 
H1: Earning management has significantly decreased following substantial convergence with 
IFRS in China and Hong Kong 
H2: The regulatory environments have significant impact on firms’ manipulations of real 
earnings and discretionary accruals in China and Hong Kong. 
H3: Financial reporting quality is higher for Chinese companies cross listed in the Hong 
Kong stock exchange than for Hong Kong companies that are cross listed in mainland China. 
 
6. Discussion of Results 
Descriptive results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample variables for Chinese A-share firms 
and Hong Kong listed firms in the convergence period. A comparison of the sample firms 
reveals that the mean and median for all non-dummy test variables are significantly different, 
with the exception of change in operation cash flows (ΔCF). The change in net income (ΔNI) 
                                                          
5
 See EC Regulation No. 1606/2002. 
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decreases in Hong Kong listed firms with negative mean and median, which are –0.0141 and 
-0.0028 respectively. On the contrary, A-share firms have experienced an increase in ΔNI 
(positive mean). It can be seen also that the book value of equity per share (BVEPS) is 
substantially larger for Hong Kong sample firms that for A-share sample firms. Both the 
Hong Kong listed firms and the Chinese A-share firms have negative stock returns of -0.0168 
and -0.0151 respectively in the post-convergence period, though the mean difference is not 
significant. 
Although the size of both groups of sample firms is similar, the Hong Kong listed firms have 
higher growth than the A-shares firms. However, the test statistics do not uncover significant 
difference in growth between the two groups. Further, the result demonstrates that A-shares 
firms have higher probability to issue debt than Hong Kong listed firms (median difference is 
significant). At the same time, it is highly leveraged for the A-shares firms compared to the 
Hong Kong firms, and the mean of leverage ratio is 1.4280 and 0.9688 respectively (both 
mean and median differences are significant). Finally, the Hong Kong listed firms are more 
likely to be audited by the Big four auditors (AUD), which implies that Hong Kong has more 
professionals and better audit environment.  
 
< Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Empirical results 
Table 2 presents a comparison of financial reporting quality metrics using earnings 
management, timely loss recognition and value relevance for firms listed in Chinese A-share 
market before and after substantial convergence with IFRS. The results reveal that the firms 
exhibit less earnings management, more timely loss recognition. Furthermore, the reported 
accounting and financial figures are more value relevant since 2007 (i.e. after convergence), 
which is consistent with the predictions. This result makes IFRS adoption itself a contingent 
factor for obtaining a high quality financial reporting system. 
Panel A (Table 2) compares earnings management metrics of A-share firms between pre and 
post-convergence periods. The first three earnings management measures report on the 
residuals after regressing each dependent variable on a specific set of control variables. The 
21 
 
first finding suggests that Chinese A-share firms exhibit a substantially higher volatility in net 
income (ΔNI*) than in the post period, i.e. 0.0236 versus 0.0058 and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This finding is consistent with the prediction that the 
reporting earnings for Chinese A-share firms are more volatile since 2007. 
The second earnings management metric, the volatility of change in operating cash flow is 
examined on the same controlled variable as the first metric. Similar to the first result, the 
finding indicates that the ratio of the variability of change in net income, ΔNI*, to the 
variability of the change in cash flow, ΔCF*, is higher in the post-convergence period than 
that in pre-convergence period. The ratio changes from 0.7749 in pre-adoption period to 
2.3561 and cash flow variability is similar for the two samples, which suggests that it is not 
the higher volatility in cash flows that leads to the higher earnings variability in the post-
convergence period. The high difference of 1.5812 confirms the existence of earnings 
smoothing in the earlier result.  
 
However, the third metric, the correlation between accruals and cash flows after convergence 
(-0.8214) is more negative than before adoption (-0.7568), though the difference is not 
significant. This finding contrasts with the prediction that A-shares firms have a significantly 
less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows in the post-convergence period. 
This result however indicates that A-firms engage in smoothing as managers increase 
accruals to make up for poor cash flow (Liu, 2011). 
Finally, the fourth earning management metric analyses the regression of small positive net 
income on control variables. The result reveals that there is a significant negative coefficient 
(-0.0881) for small positive net income, SPOS, which suggests that A-share firms are more 
likely to manage earnings toward positive target after substantially converging with IFRS.  
 
< Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Taken together, these results are consistent with our predictions, that Chinese listed firms 
engage less in earnings smoothing in the post-convergence period than in the pre- 
convergence period. The results depict the positive impact of IFRS in improving the quality 
of financial reporting. 
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Panel B (Table 2) compares measures of timely loss recognition between two periods. Based 
on Lang et al. (2006), reported earnings are regressed on returns, a bad news earnings 
indicator, and the interaction of the two variables. It is suggested that more timely loss 
recognition will result in a larger coefficient estimate on bad news earnings in the regression. 
The coefficient of RETURN * BAD is 0.0292 in the post period, significantly higher than 
that in pre period (0.0069). This finding indicates that managers in A-shares firms are more 
likely to report large losses in timely fashion since the companies adopt substantially IFRS-
convergent standard.  
Panel C presents the results of value relevance tests. The price model is to test the level of 
association between accounting number and share price. The regression of share price on 
earnings per share and book value of equity demonstrates a significantly higher R
2
 in post-
adoption period (24.37%) than pre-convergence period (12.60%). For the return model, the 
sample is separated into two categories based on good news and bad news. The R
2
 of the 
regression of earnings per share on good news (bad news), 5.73% (0.39%) is also higher in 
post-adoption period than that in pre-adoption period, 0.09% (0.18%). These findings 
indicate that value relevance of accounting data has improved after substantially convergent 
with IFRS for Chinese A-shares firms, which is consistent with our prediction.  
 
< Insert Table 3 here> 
 
Table 3 presents results comparing the quality of financial reporting for firms listed in Hong 
Kong before and after the IFRS regime. The results are mostly consistent with the prediction 
that the accounting quality is higher for Hong Kong listed firms than A-share firms. It reveals 
that Hong Kong listed firms experience less earning management, more timely loss 
recognition and more value relevance of accounting and financial information. 
In terms of earnings management, Hong Kong listed firms exhibit a significantly low 
variability of change in net income, ΔNI*, a negligible difference of 0.0018 after the IFRS 
convergence. The second metric of earning management is the ratio of the variance of change 
in net income, ΔNI*, to variance of change in cash flow, ΔCF*, which shows a difference of 
0.031. The negligible figure of the difference indicates that firms engage less in earnings 
management. This is consistent with the first finding of low volatility in earnings.  The 
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correlation between accruals, ACC*, and cash flow, CFO*, for firms listed in Hong Kong 
firms is -0.0830, is significantly less negative than the pre adoption ratio (-0.0821). The 
coefficient on SPOS, -0.3898, is negative, which suggests that Hong Kong firms are less 
likely to manage earnings in both periods. Overall, the findings for earning management 
provide evidence that firms listed in Hong Kong have higher accounting quality than A-share 
firms in the forms of less earnings smoothing behaviour. 
Lang et al. (2006) argue that more timely loss recognition will result in a larger coefficient 
estimate on bad news earnings in the regression of earnings on returns. The coefficient of 
Return*BAD is larger for Hong Kong listed firms in the post-convergence period, 0.7171 
versus 0.0292, suggesting that large losses are reported in timely manner by Hong Kong 
listed firms in the post-convergence period. 
In terms of value relevance, regression of price on net income and equity book value reveal 
that the R
2 
for firms listed in Hong Kong is significantly larger than that for A-shares firms, 
which are 62.08% and 24.37% respectively. However, contrary to the prediction, the R
2 
value 
for good news and bad news in return model is lower for firms listed in Hong Kong. Thus, 
the price regression suggests that accounting data are more value relevant for firms listed in 
Hong Kong than A-share firms while the return model findings do not. Overall, these result 
lay credence to the contingency theory as the effective management of earnings   is, as 
observed above, contingent upon the regulatory environment and IFRS adoption (post-IFRS). 
 
Sensitivity Analyses - Real versus Accrual-based earnings management 
The consideration for the sensitivity analyses is that the regulatory environment may be 
influential in the earnings management behaviour of firms. Prior studies argue that firms may 
engage in real earnings management to avoid reporting annual losses (Roychowdhury, 2006), 
but may not manipulate earnings through discretionary accruals.  We argue that firms from 
stronger regulatory environments may curb accrual-based earnings management and 
intolerant to real earnings management, which can also be affected by the regulatory 
environment.  
Therefore, segmenting the firms into two regulatory environments i.e. Chinese firms in Hong 
Kong and vice versa; and differentiating the earnings management practices into real and 
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accrual-based will help to clarify whether such practices are influenced by the regulatory 
environments.  
 The results shown in Table 4 indicate that firms listed in China are more likely to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management than in real earnings management activities even after 
the converging with IFRS. Abnormal cash flows from operations and   discretionary expenses 
are significantly negative (-0.025 and -0.040) in both periods indicating that real earnings 
manipulations are less tolerated particularly after the convergence. Conversely, Hong Kong 
firms tolerate some forms of real earnings management such as abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses as both show positive significance of 0.579 
and 0.088 but would not condoned accrual based manipulations such as discretionary 
accruals. These results indicate that the leverage on forms of earnings manipulations used by 
firms in the two regions is affected by the operational and regulatory environment. For Hong 
Kong firms, the negative significance with discretionary accruals earning management 
activities indicates that such practices remotely occur.  
The results demonstrate that different earnings management practices that are tolerable in one 
country may not be the case in another which is largely affected by the level of regulations. 
Cross-listed firms tend to imbibe the earnings management culture of their environment. For 
instance, firms from countries where the regulations are strict, if cross listed in weakly 
regulated environments are likely to lower their financial reporting quality. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the control of earning management practices is contingent upon the strength of 
a country’s regulatory environment.  
< Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Further Robust Check 
To check that our results on real and discretionary earnings management are consistent with 
our prediction that regulatory environment influence earnings management practices, we run 
the same regression on set of non-cross listed firms.   Lin and Liu (2009) show that regulatory 
controls can be critical in adhering to financial reporting standards or engaging in earnings 
manipulation activities. Thus, we argue that non cross listed Chinese firms are more likely to 
engage in accrual-based earnings manipulation as they operate under a less strict control 
environment. As such, Chinese firms, cross-listed in Hong Kong and therefore outside the 
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Chinese regulatory authorities are expected to conform to the standards measurable with 
Hong Kong firms and thus likely to engage in some forms of real earning management. 
The results as presented in Table 5 are consistent with our hypothesis that Chinese indigenous 
firms are more likely to engage in discretionary accruals than in accrual-based earnings 
management. Conversely, we find that Hong firms are more prone to engaging in real 
earnings management though at a lesser degree since the IFRS convergence.   
  
< Insert Table 5 here> 
 
Difference-in-difference analysis 
To further examine the impact of the regulatory environment on IFRS adoption between 
China and Hong Kong, we conduct a difference-in-difference (DID) test. The DID test is 
applied here for three reasons: first to compare the influence of IFRS on the management of 
earnings in the pre and post IFRS adoption in both countries. Second, it allows us to cater for 
differences in regulatory environments in the two countries and third, it is used to check for 
the endogeneity problem of omitted variables associated with our sample selection
6
.   
The DID analysis is based on the mean aggregate of the earnings management variables and 
the result presented in Table 6 shows a greater reduction in the earnings management of 
Chinese firms more than in Hong Kong firms. This is remarkable as the mean difference 
shows a remarkable significance of 0.36, indicating the positive influence of IFRS on the 
quality of financial reporting in China than in Hong Kong. 
< Insert Table 6 here> 
 
7. Conclusion 
Our results reveal that Chinese firms exhibit less earning management, more timely loss 
recognition and the reported accounting and financial figures are more value relevant since 
2007, which is consistent with the predictions. The results are consistent with prior studies 
which indicate that Chinese listed firms engage less in earnings smoothing in the post-
convergence period than in the pre- convergence period. The results depict the positive 
                                                          
6
 Gordon et al (2012) apply similar approach in testing the endogeneity issues of self –selection of adoption of 
IFRS adoption between developed and developing economies.  
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impact of IFRS in improving the quality of financial reporting thereby making IFRS adoption 
(post-IFRS) a strong contingent factor for high quality financial reporting (with effective 
control of earning management). This is also consistent with prior studies which suggest that 
there is more earning management and lower value relevance in weaker investor protection 
environments (Leuz et al, 2003).  
 
The findings are also consistent with the prediction that the accounting quality is higher for 
Hong Kong listed firms than for Chinese firms. It shows that Hong Kong listed firms 
experience less earning management, more timely loss recognition and more value relevance 
of accounting and financial information. Our results suggest that large losses are reported in 
timely manner by Hong Kong listed firms in the post-convergence period. Similarly, the 
results of real and discretionary accrual measures reveal that different earnings management 
practices can be tolerable in one country and not in another, largely due to the level of 
regulations. In addition, cross-listed firms tend to follow culture in their environment. 
Our study reveals that the regulatory environment influence earnings management practices 
as firms from strong and stricter regulatory environments are seen to be tolerant to certain 
earnings manipulations if cross listed in less regulatory environments. The DID analysis 
indicates a greater reduction in the earnings managements of Chinese firms after the IFRS 
convergence indicating the positive impact of the IFRS on the quality of financial reporting in 
China than in Hong Kong. Through the frame of the contingency theory, therefore, these 
results confirm a country’s institutional structures, its extent of regulation and the strength of 
its investor protection environments as strong contingent factors that determine the quality of 
financial reporting capable of effectively controlling earning management practices. The 
foregoing results and the emerging contingent factors should be able to guide financial 
reporting regulators and standard setters as well as policy-makers within relevant government 
agencies in their efforts in curbing the incidence of earnings management practices. They will 
also guide government policies, as in the case of China, towards strengthening financial 
reporting systems. 
Notwithstanding the relevance and adoption of the contingency theory in this study, the 
theory has been criticised by a number of writers. For example, Schoonhoven (1981) opined 
that contingency theory is an orienting strategy (or meta-theory) rather than a theory in the 
conventional sense. He therefore suggested its use as an underlying conceptual framework 
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upon which other perspectives can be applied. Similarly, Scott (1987: 507-509) observed that 
unless combined with another theory, contingency theory standing alone cannot offer a whole 
understanding of the different roles carried out by various management practices (in the 
forms of control and coordination) that are used in modern organisations. As such, we 
suggest that future research could explore combining institutional theory with the 
contingency theory with a view to drawing out institutional factors that may influence the 
effectiveness of the contingent factors identified in the current study. Also, it will be 
interesting to see how these results might change if the earning management metrics are 
altered – an idea that might worth exploring by future studies on the subject. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics of A-share firms in pre and post period 
 Chinese A-shares firms Hong Kong listed firms 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Test Variables       
ΔNI 0.0005  -0.0003  0.1563  -0.0141*  -0.0028*  0.2083***  
ΔCF -0.0051  -0.0058  0.1295  0.0001  -0.0009 0.0975***  
CFO 0.0424  0.0441  0.1030  0.0306  0.0289***  0.0855***  
ACC -0.0044  -0.0131  0.1283  0.7155***  0.0041***  4.0143***  
SPOS 0.1330  0.0000  0.3397  0.1425  0.0000  0.3498  
Price 11.8801  9.3050  8.2173  15.0745**  2.7200***  26.6984*** 
BVEPS 3.3512  2.8050  2.1672  14.6308***  3.2012  25.8241***  
NIPS 0.3046   0.2050   0.4278  1.4776***  0.1766  13.1752***  
NI/P 0.0242  0.0236  0.0517  1.7059***  0.0713***  12.4935***  
RETURN -0.0151  -0.0326  0.3757  -0.0168  -0.0140**  0.3903  
Control Variables       
SIZE 8.4664  8.4033  1.1976  8.7979  8.4212  2.1624***  
GROWTH 0.2618  0.1393  0.9417  0.3870  0.0691***  2.5063***  
EISSUE 0.2416  0.0783  2.0944  0.2210  0.0885  1.0666***  
DISSUE 0.3150  0.1259  2.6644  0.5560  0.0582***  3.9273***  
TURN 0.7650  0.5762  0.7534  0.3916***  0.1947***  0.5097***  
LEV 1.4280  1.1860  2.9218  0.9688**  0.4723***  6.3831***  
CFO 0.0424  0.0441  0.1030  0.0306  0.0289***  0.0855***  
AUD 0.1250  0.0000  0.3309  0.6800***  1.0000***  0.4671***  
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Table 2:  Financial Reporting Quality Measures Analysis of Chinese A-share Firms  
Panel A: Earning Management Metrics -    
 Predict Pre Post Diff. 
Variability of ΔNI* Post>Pre 0.0236 0.0058*** 0.0178 
Variability of ΔNI*/ΔCF* Post>Pre 0.7749  2.3561  1.5812 
Correlation of ACC* and CFO* Post>Pre -0.7568  -0.8214  -0.0646 
Small positive net income 
(SPOS) 
 -0.0881##   
Panel B: Timely Loss Recognition Metrics 
 
 
 Return*BAD coefficient Post>Pre 0.0069 0.0292** 0.0223 
Panel C: Value Relevance Metrics (R
2
) 
 
 
Price Model Post>Pre 0.1260  0.2437*  0.1177 
Return Model     
Good news Post>Pre 0.0009  0.0573*  0.0564 
Bad news Post>Pre 0.0018  0.0039  0.0021 
*, **, ***indicates significant difference from pre-adoption and post- adoption at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
confidence level, respectively (one-sided). ## indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level (one-
sided). 
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Table 3: Financial Reporting Quality Analysis of Hong Kong Firms 
 Panel A: Earning Management Metrics -   
 Predict Pre Post Diff 
Variability of ΔNI* Post>Pre 0.0218 0.0236 *** 0.0018 
Variability of ΔNI*/ΔCF* Post>Pre 2.3561   2.3871 0.031 
Correlation of ACC* and CFO* Post>Pre -0.0821  -0.0830*** -0.0009 
Small positive net income (SPOS)  -0.03898##   
Panel B: Timely Loss Recognition Metrics 
 
 
 Return*BAD coefficient HK> A share 0.0292 0.7171***  0.6879 
Panel C: Value Relevance Metrics (R2) 
 
 
Price Model HK> A share 0.2437 0.6208*** 0.3771 
Return Model     
Good news HK> A share 0.0573 0.0023  -0.055 
Bad news HK> A share 0.0039 0.0002  0.0037 
*, **, ***indicates significant difference from pre-adoption and post- adoption at the 10%, 5% and 
1% confidence level, respectively (one-sided). 
## indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level (one-sided). 
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Table 4: Result of the Real versus Accrual-based (discretionary) earnings management 
of China and Hong Kong firms 
The accrual-based earnings are discretionary accruals while the real earnings activities 
include abnormal cash flows from operations, production cost and discretionary expenses of 
the firms.  
 
Cross listed firms 
 
China 
 
 
Hong Kong 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Discretionary (accrual- 
based) accruals 
0.018*** 
(0.019) 
0.322*** 
(0.153) 
-1.241** 
(-0.012) 
-0.010** 
(-0.003) 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations 
 
-0.005* 
(-0.214) 
-0.025* 
(-0.002) 
0.102** 
(0.017) 
0.579*** 
(0.196) 
Abnormal production costs 
 
-0.060 
(-0.008) 
-0.077 
(-0.007) 
-0.060 
(-0.201) 
-0.102 
(-0.187) 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
-0.032** 
(-0.014) 
-0.040** 
(-0.172) 
0.11** 
(0.015) 
0.088** 
(0.098) 
***significant at the 1% level,**significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 5: Robust Check – Non cross-listed firms 
 
 
Non-Listed firms 
 
China 
 
Hong Kong 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Discretionary(accrual-based) 
accruals 
0.272*** 
(0.052) 
0.283*** 
(0.035) 
-1.287*** 
(-0.186) 
-3.686*** 
(-0.363) 
Abnormal cash flows from 
operations 
 
-0.235** 
(-0.023) 
-0.203* 
(-0.031) 
0.405** 
(0.063) 
0.579** 
(0.196) 
Abnormal production costs 
 
0.142** 
(0.047) 
0.526** 
(0.057) 
0.046* 
(0.020) 
0.121* 
(0.037) 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
-0.282** 
(-0.024) 
-0.625*** 
(-0.093) 
0.014** 
(0.078) 
0.015** 
(0.028) 
*, **, ***indicates significant difference from pre-adoption and post- adoption at the 10%, 5% and 
1% confidence level, respectively (one-sided). 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Difference-in-difference analysis 
 Pre- IFRS adoption Post-IFRS adoption Mean Difference 
China 17.56 20.21 2.65 
Hong Kong 13.74 15.03 1.29 
 3.82 5.18 0.36* 
*significant at the 10% level, and indicates the difference in regulatory environment of China 
and Hong Kong after the adoption period. 
 
